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Aßvagho∑a, being one of the earliest classical Sanskrit poets whose work has survived at 
least in part, is an extremely important source of information for Brahmanical thought. 
Though himself a Buddhist, Aßvagho∑a was very well acquainted with Brahmanical culture, 
as has been documented by E. H. Johnston in the introduction to his English translation of 
the Buddhacarita. Johnston enumerates the different departments of Brahmanical learning 
known to Aßvagho∑a, which are numerous, but which do not include the Vaiße∑ika system 
of philosophy. Johnston claims that this system was “entirely unknown to Aßvagho∑a”, and 
observes that this is remarkable in view of the fact that the outstanding position of this 
system is freely recognised in later Buddhist literature. He continues: “The argument ex 
silentio for once has cogent force, because in later Buddhist lists corresponding to 
[Saundarananda], xvi. 17 (e.g. La∫kåvatåra and Visuddhimagga), reference to the 
Vaiße∑ikas is included by the addition of the word aˆu.” 
 Johnston's conclusions are important, because they are based on a thorough 
acquaintance with the texts. And yet there is at least one passage in the Buddhacarita which 
makes most sense if read in the light of Vaiße∑ika thought.1 The passage occurs in the 
twelfth chapter (sarga) of this work, in the discussion between the Bodhisattva and his 
teacher Arå∂a Kålåma. What Arå∂a teaches him is in many respects close to Såµkhya, and 
Arå∂a's teachings as reported by Aßvagho∑a are indeed an important source for the early 
history of that school of thought. However, not all Arå∂a teaches is Såµkhya; the path of 
meditation which he recommends to the Bodhisattva is in fact thoroughly Buddhist in 
nature, in which however some Såµkhya notions survive, prominent among them the idea 
of a k∑etrajña “knower of the field”. The Bodhisattva rejects Arå∂a's path, concentrating in 
particular on this specific notion. He maintains that no liberation is possible as long as the 
notion of a self is not abandoned. In this context he presents some arguments which are 
difficult to understand against a Såµkhya background. 
 Consider first Buddhacarita 12.77, which reads: 
 
                                                
1 This passage has also been studied by Murakami, 1978: 772 ff. 
Aßvagho∑a and Vaiße∑ika  2 
 
 
 saµkhyådibhir amuktaß ca nirguˆo na bhavaty ayam/ 




And as the soul is not released from the activity of reason and the like (saµkhyådi), 
it is not devoid of attribute (guˆa); therefore, as it is not devoid of attribute, it is not 
admitted to be liberated. 
 
Johnston is not however very sure of this translation. In a note he makes a number of 
observations, among them the following: “The exact meaning of saµkhyå here is uncertain; 
if it could be solved, we should perhaps know how the name Såµkhya arose. ... What 
attributes are indicated by ådi also escapes me. It would be wrong to understand a 
secondary sense in the second line with reference to the guˆas of classical Såµkhya, for the 
word guˆa in Aßvagho∑a's day was ordinarily used in Såµkhya discussions of anything 
rather than the three factors of prak®ti, and in the Såµkhya known to the poet salvation was 
attained by the destruction of rajas and tamas only, sattva remaining alone in an enhanced 
state.” 
 The difficulties surrounding the correct interpretation of saµkhyå vanish when we 
consider the possibility that a Vaiße∑ika-like position is criticised here. The word saµkhyå 
in classical Vaiße∑ika means number, and numbers are conceived of in this system as 
qualities (guˆa). Even a liberated soul will, from the Vaiße∑ika perspective, possess the 
quality ‘number’ by virtue of the fact that it has a number: each liberated soul by itself is 
one in number. Nor is number the only quality which even a liberated soul will possess. 
Praßasta's Padårthadharmasa∫graha alias Praßastapådabhå∑ya explicitly enumerates the 
following qualities (guˆa) that can reside in the soul (WI § 80, p. 16): buddhi, sukha, 
du˙kha, icchå, dve∑a, prayatna, dharma, adharma, saµskåra, saµkhyå, parimåˆa, p®thaktva, 
saµyoga, and vibhåga. The first nine of these do not remain in a liberated soul; some of the 
remaining ones will. 
 It follows, then, that the above stanza allows of the following translation, which 
makes complete sense against the background of Vaiße∑ika thought: 
 
And as the [soul] is not released from number etc., it is not devoid of qualities; 
therefore, as it is not devoid of qualities, it is not admitted to be liberated. 
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The possibility that stanza 12.77 does not deal with, and therefore does not criticise 
Såµkhya ideas is strengthened by the immediately following stanza. Buddhacarita 12.78 
reads: 
 
guˆino hi guˆånåµ ca vyatireko na vidyate/ 
rËpo∑ˆåbhyåµ virahito na hy agnir upalabhyate// 
 
Johnston's translation, in which I have substituted ‘qualities’ for ‘attributes’, reads: 
 
For no distinction exists between the qualities and the possessor of the qualities; for 
instance, fire is not perceived, when devoid of outward appearance (rËpa) and heat 
(u∑ˆa). 
 
Outward appearance (rËpa) and touch (sparßa), of which hot touch is but a variety, are 
qualities of fire both in Såµkhya2 and in Vaiße∑ika3. The mention of these two does not 
therefore allow us to determine what position is criticised here. However, the denial of a 
distinction between qualities and the possessor of qualities makes no sense if Såµkhya is 
criticised. The Såµkhya of the ›a∑†itantra — as testified by various early authors, among 
them Bhart®hari, Mallavådin, and Dharmapåla (Bronkhorst, 1994) — maintained that 
objects are nothing but collections of qualities. Aßvagho∑a's own description of Såµkhya 
(Buddhacarita 12. 18 f.) includes the qualities as final evolutes among its fundamental 
tattvas, which seems to indicate that this form of Såµkhya, too, saw material objects as 
collections of qualities. Vaiße∑ika, on the other hand, has always distinguished between the 
two. 
 The assumption that the opinion here criticised by Aßvagho∑a shares some essential 
features with early Vaiße∑ika finds confirmation in a curious line of argument which the 
Bodhisattva presents in stanzas 12.80-81. The soul is here still called k∑etrajña, a term 
common in Såµkhya and unknown in classical Vaiße∑ika, but this choice of terminology 
should not lead us astray. Nor should we be confused by the first half of the argumentation, 
which raises problems of its own. Its second half is such that a link with Vaiße∑ika ideas 
inevitably comes to mind. These stanzas read: 
 
k∑etrajño vißar¥raß ca jño vå syåd ajña eva vå/ 
                                                
2 E.g. YD p. 225 l. 17: ßabdasparßaguˆåt sparßatanmåtråt triguˆaµ teja˙. 
3 Cp. VS(C) 2.1.3: tejo rËpasparßavat; 2.2.4: tejasy u∑ˆatå. 
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yadi jño jñeyam asyåsti jñeye sati na mucyate// 
athåjña iti siddho va˙ kalpitena kim åtmanå/ 
vinåpi hy åtmanåjñånaµ prasiddhaµ kå∑†haku∂yavat// 
 
Johnston's translation, slightly modified, has: 
 
And the knower of the field, when without a body, must be either knowing or 
unknowing. If it is knowing, there is something for it to know, and if there is 
something for it to know, it is not liberated. 
Or if your teaching is that it is unknowing, what then is the use of inventing the 
existence of a soul? For even without a soul the feature of not-knowing is well 
established as in the case of a log or a wall. 
 
Once again, this criticism has not much force if directed against something like classical 
Såµkhya, which conceives of the consciousness of the soul as being essentially without 
object. Vaiße∑ika, on the other hand, thinks of consciousness as essentially object-oriented. 
What is more, consciousness or knowledge (buddhi) is, in Vaiße∑ika, a quality (guˆa) of the 
soul which does not remain in the state of liberation. The liberated soul, and consequently 
the soul in and by itself, is unconscious, and therefore like a log or like a wall. This view of 
liberation has been ridiculed by others,4 but appears to be inseparable from Vaiße∑ika. The 
fact that we find it here in the Buddhacarita can be taken as an indication that Aßvagho∑a 
was familiar with this notion, and therefore possibly acquainted with Vaiße∑ika. 
  
At this point we have to turn to Eli Franco's recent article about “the earliest extant 
Vaiße∑ika theory of guˆas” (2000). Franco presents here some fragments from the Spitzer 
manuscript, which presumably dates from the 3rd century C.E. at the latest.5 These 
fragments seem to criticise a Vaiße∑ika position which does not in all respects tally with the 
Vaiße∑ika of the Padårthadharmasa∫graha and other later works. These fragments appear to 
refer to an omnipresent (sarvagata) soul,6 and speak about qualities that inhere in the soul 
                                                
4 See e.g. Ny p. 636 l. 12-13: atha matam: acetanasyåtmano muktasyåpi på∑åˆåd aviße∑a˙, so 'pi hi na 
sukhåyate na ca du˙khåyate, mukto 'pi yadi tathaiva, ko 'nayor viße∑a˙?; Bhåskara on BrahmasËtra 2.2.37: 
påßupatavaiße∑ikanaiyåyikakåpålikånåm avißi∑†å˙ muktyavasthåyåµ på∑åˆakalpå åtmåno bhavant[i]; id on 
1.1.19: anyathå sukharahitaµ brahma vaiße∑ikådimatavat pråpnoti; further Maˆ∂anamißra's Brahmasiddhi (ed. 
Madras 1937) p. 16 l. 14-16. 
5 Franco, 2000a: 559-558 (= [52]-[53]); 2000b: 87-88. 
6 Franco (2000: 162) states: “This reference [to an omnipresent soul] is of particular interest because it has 
been widely assumed that in early Vaiße∑ika the åtman was only as large as the body. If this assumption is 
correct, our text provides the earliest reference to the new åtman doctrine of the Vaiße∑ika and confirms that 
this change in the åtman doctrine took place at a rather early age in the history of the Vaiße∑ika, perhaps as 
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and can become “contracted into a minute state” (aˆusamavasthåsaµh®ta).7 In that state 
they are as if destroyed (pralayagå˙ khalv api vina∑†å iva; p. 158)8 though not really 
destroyed (avina∑†am api sat aˆusamavasthåsaµh®tam api pral¥nam ity ucyate; p. 161), and 
unperceived (åtmany eva tu pral¥naµ nopalabhyate; p. 161). 
 These fragments from the Spitzer manuscripts confront us with a number of riddles 
which it may not be possible to solve in the present state of our knowledge. We can 
however raise the question whether all qualities that inhere in the soul can undergo such a 
“contraction into a minute state”, including the qualities that are not specific to the soul, 
such as ‘number’ etc. If so, one could imagine that the Vaiße∑ikas of that time used this as 
an answer to the objection which we know from the Buddhacarita, viz., that the liberated 
soul of the Vaiße∑ikas still possesses the qualities ‘number’ etc. The Vaiße∑ikas could not of 
course deny this — after all, one liberated soul remains one liberated soul; it does not 
become numberless by being liberated —, but they might point out that the remaining 
qualities had become totally harmless, indeed as good as destroyed, by this “contraction 
into a minute state”. 
 All this is of course pure speculation and should be taken as such. It may 
nonetheless be useful to ask the question whether the objection against Vaiße∑ika (if it is 
one) that we find in the Buddhacarita may also have occupied the minds of others, 
including the Vaiße∑ikas themselves, and whether the latter felt the need to find an answer 




                                                                                                                                               
early as the 2nd c. A.D.” It is of course more straightforward to look upon this reference as additional 
evidence that in Vaiße∑ika the åtman was conceived of as being omnipresent right from the beginning; see 
Bronkhorst, 1993: 87 ff.; 1993a: 565 ff. 
7 This translation is to be preferred to Franco's “[contracted] into the state of an atom” (p. 159, 161). The 
reason is that in Vaiße∑ika qualities, even though they cannot possess ‘size’ which is another quality (so 
Franco, 2000: 162), can certainly be confined to a part of their substrates or be coextensive with them (cp. WI 
§ 112-113, p. 20: saµyogavibhågaßabdåtmaviße∑aguˆånåµ pradeßav®ttitvam, ße∑åˆåm åßrayavyåpitvam). 
There is therefore in principle no theoretical objection against them becoming “contracted into a minute state” 
but, being qualities and not substances, they cannot be contracted into the state of an atom. In another 
publication Franco (2001: 11) concludes from the use elsewhere in the Spitzer manuscript of the compounds 
guˆaguˆa and guˆåvayava “that our text was written before the establishment of the classical Vaiße∑ika 
doctrine that qualities may not be qualified by further qualities and not have parts”. This conclusion is far 
from compelling, since these compounds occur in a context that does not deal with Vaiße∑ika but with “a 
Buddhist pramåˆa-theory”, as Franco himself points out. 
8 Here and in what follows I present Franco's reconstructions / conjectures. 
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